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Abstract. In the paper, we generalize a two-action (yes-no) model of inﬂuence to a framework
in which every player has a continuum of actions and he has to choose one of them. We assume
the set of actions to be an interval. Each player has an inclination to choose one of the actions.
Due to inﬂuence among players, the ﬁnal decision of a player, i.e., his choice of one action, may be
diﬀerent from his original inclination. In particular, a coalition of players with the same inclination
may inﬂuence another player with diﬀerent inclination, and as a result of this inﬂuence, the decision
of the player is closer to the inclination of the inﬂuencing coalition than his inclination was. We
introduce and study a measure of such a positive inﬂuence of a coalition on a player. There is
the equivalence between the inﬂuence index of a coalition on a player in a social network and the
analogous inﬂuence index in a corresponding network in which the coalition in question is treated
as one player. Several unanimous inﬂuence functions in this generalized framework are considered.
Moreover, we investigate other tools for analyzing inﬂuence, like the concept of a follower of a
given coalition, its particular case - a perfect follower, and the kernel of an inﬂuence function. We
study properties of these concepts. Also the set of ﬁxed points under a given inﬂuence function
is analyzed. Furthermore, we study linear inﬂuence functions. We also introduce a measure of a
negative inﬂuence of a coalition on a player.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Short overview of the related literature
In the voting literature, usually binary voting is assumed, for instance, casting ‘yes’ or
‘no’ vote on a particular proposal or voting for one of two available candidates. However,
one may ﬁnd several works that extend the number of options in voting situations. For
instance, voting systems with abstention (as a third option together with ‘yes’ and ‘no’
votes) are studied e.g. in Braham and Steﬀen (2002, [6]), Felsenthal and Machover (1997,
1998, 2001, [8–10]), Fishburn (1973, [11]). Works on voting systems with several levels of
approval in the input and output can be found in Freixas (2005a, 2005b, [12,13]), Freixas
⋆ This research project is supported by the National Agency for Research (Agence Nationale de la Recherche),
Reference: ANR-09-BLAN-0321-01.and Zwicker (2003, [14]). In particular, standard simple games and games with abstention
can be easily deﬁned in such an extended framework. Also in Hsiao and Raghavan (1993,
[20]) multi-choice games are studied, and in Bolger (1986, 1993, 2000, 2002, [2–5]) games
with n players and r alternatives are analyzed.
Considering a continuum of alternatives or choices in models of game theory and social
choice theory is interesting both from a theoretical and an application point of view, since
many real life situations can be modeled in the framework with a continuum of actions
or options. However, not that many works so far, in particular, in the voting literature,
concern models with a continuum of alternatives. One of such examples is presented in
Chang and Stauber (2006, [7]), where the authors extend a costly voting model with bi-
nary voting to a model in which a choice has to be made from a continuum of alternatives.
The agents have to decide whether or not to participate in a collective decision-making
process that determines the level of a public good. There are costs associated with the act
of voting and the implementation of the voting outcome. In the social choice literature,
models with a continuum of alternatives are studied, e.g., in Abdou (1988, [1]), Huang
(2004, 2009, [23,24]).
One of the concepts naturally related to voting situations is the concept of inﬂuence.
In the original two-action model of inﬂuence introduced in Hoede and Bakker (1982,
[19]) and later studied, e.g., in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2009b, [16]), each player (also
referred to as agent or actor) has to make an acceptance-rejection decision, and he has an
inclination to vote either ‘yes’ or ‘no’. In the multi-action model introduced in Grabisch
and Rusinowska (2010b, [18]), each player has a totally ordered set of possible actions,
the same for each player, and he has an inclination to choose a particular action. Both in
the yes-no model and its extension to multi-action framework, the inclination of a player
is deﬁned as a decision the player would make if he were to decide completely on his own.
However, an agent may experience inﬂuence of other players, and as a consequence of such
an inﬂuence, his decision may be diﬀerent from his original inclination. Such an inﬂuence
between players is deﬁned in a broad sense and may cover many possible situations: forcing
by players that are higher in a hierarchical structure, following authorities, learning and
observing the behavior of others, etc. The transformation of the inclinations into the
decisions is represented by an inﬂuence function. In Grabisch and Rusinowska (2009b,
[16]), we deﬁne and investigate weighted inﬂuence indices that measure inﬂuence between
players in the yes-no model. We consider several special cases of the weighted inﬂuence
indices, like the possibility inﬂuence index and the certainty inﬂuence index, and we
analyze two kinds of inﬂuence, i.e., a direct inﬂuence and an opposite inﬂuence. Under the
direct inﬂuence of a coalition on a player, while the inclination of the player is diﬀerent
from the inclination of the coalition, his decision is the same as the inclination of the
coalition in question. The opposite inﬂuence of a coalition on a player means that the
inclinations of the player and the coalition coincide, but the player’s vote is diﬀerent from
this inclination. In Grabisch and Rusinowska (2009a, [15]) we compare our yes-no model of
inﬂuence with the framework of command games introduced by Hu and Shapley (2003a,
2003b, [21,22]). One of the central concepts of the command games is the concept of
command function. In Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010a, [17]) we study, e.g., the relation
between inﬂuence function and follower function, and the relation between command
games and inﬂuence functions. In Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010b, [18]) we enlarge the
set of possible yes-no decisions of the inﬂuence model to a multi-choice framework. We
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multi-choice model. First, we analyze a positive inﬂuence of a coalition on a player, which
measures how much a decision of the player with inclination diﬀerent from the inclination
of the given coalition is closer to the inclination of the coalition than his inclination was.
A direct inﬂuence in the yes-no model is a particular case of the positive inﬂuence. We
also investigate a negative inﬂuence of a coalition on a player, which measures how much
a decision of the player with inclination diﬀerent from extreme (farthest) actions of the
coalition, comes ‘closer’ to the extreme action. An opposite inﬂuence in the yes-no model
is a particular case of the negative inﬂuence.
1.2 Aims and a context summary of the present paper
The present paper is a continuation of our research on the inﬂuence indices deﬁned for
the yes-no model and for the multi-action framework of inﬂuence. We consider now a
generalization of the inﬂuence model in a social network and assume that each player has
a continuum of actions to choose, and he has an inclination to choose one of them. The aim
of the present paper is therefore to deﬁne the inﬂuence concepts for the continuum case
and to verify if, and if so how, our previous results obtained in the multi-choice framework
change when we switch to the continuum case. Similar as in our former investigations on
inﬂuence, we are interested in situations, where a decision of a player (the ﬁnal choice of
one action) is diﬀerent from his (preliminary) inclination. To be more precise, we deﬁne
a positive inﬂuence index of a coalition on a player for the continuum case. This index
measures how much the player chooses an action which is closer to the inclination of
the coalition than his inclination was. The inﬂuence index deﬁned for the model with a
continuum of actions is therefore related both to the direct (possibility) inﬂuence index
of the yes-no model and to the positive inﬂuence index of the multi-action model of
inﬂuence. Furthermore, we deﬁne a negative inﬂuence index for the framework with a
continuum of actions. Such an index is related to the opposite (possibility) inﬂuence
index of the yes-no model and to the negative inﬂuence index deﬁned in the multi-
action framework. The negative inﬂuence of a coalition on a player means that while the
inclination of the player is diﬀerent from the extreme action(s) of the coalition (that is,
the action(s) lying as far as possible from the inclination of the coalition), the player’s
decision comes ‘closer’ to such an extreme action and goes farther from the inclination
of the coalition. As in the previous studies, we adopt a very broad deﬁnition of inﬂuence
which also covers some situations that do not mean the explicit inﬂuence. According
to our deﬁnition of inﬂuence, if a player’s decision is diﬀerent from his inclination and
happens to be closer to our inclination, then this always counts for our positive inﬂuence
on this player, without conducting a deeper analysis of real reasons of such a change.
A similar remark concerns negative inﬂuence. Since such a broad deﬁnition of inﬂuence
has been already established in the literature, we do not propose another terminology,
and like in our previous work on inﬂuence, we deﬁne the concept of an inﬂuence as a
deviation of initial inclination in the decision-making process. In this paper, we present
several examples of inﬂuence deﬁned in such a broad sense, including, e.g., the so called
negative inﬂuence, and a kind of a ‘success rate’. Furthermore, we investigate several
useful tools for studying inﬂuence. In particular, we consider the concept of followers,
where by follower of a given coalition of players we mean the agent whose decision is
always closer to the inclination of the coalition in question than his inclination was. A
3particular case of follower is a perfect follower of a coalition, that is, a player who always
decides according to the inclination of the coalition in question. We also deﬁne several
unanimous inﬂuence functions for the continuum case, like the majority function, the
guru function, the identity function, and the mass psychology function, and we study
their properties. Under such inﬂuence functions, unanimously inclined players always
decide according to their common inclination. If this holds only for the extreme actions
(0 and 1 for the model with the set of actions [0,1]), such an inﬂuence function is called
unanimous on the boundaries. We compare the results on the inﬂuence functions and
followers deﬁned for the model with a continuum of actions, with the results on followers
and the analogous inﬂuence functions introduced in the multi-choice model of inﬂuence.
Moreover, we look at the set of ﬁxed points under a given inﬂuence function, i.e., the
set of the inclination vectors that coincide with the decision vectors resulted from these
inclinations. Also linear inﬂuence functions, i.e., functions that can be written as a matrix,
are studied. For a function unanimous on the boundary 1 (for the set of actions [0,1]),
we ﬁnd a necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a positive inﬂuence of a
coalition on a player, and we calculate the value of the inﬂuence index. Furthermore, we
introduce the negative inﬂuence index and illustrate the concept using several examples.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section 2, we deﬁne the positive inﬂuence
index for the model with a continuum of actions, and we show the equivalence between the
inﬂuence index of a coalition on a player in a social network and the analogous inﬂuence
index in a corresponding network in which the coalition in question is treated as one
player. In order to illustrate clearly the concepts introduced in the paper, in Sections 3.1
and 3.2 we present examples of a two-agent social network and an analogous example
of a three-player network, respectively. Next, other tools for studying the inﬂuence are
described. The concepts of follower and perfect follower of a coalition, the kernel, and
the concept of a purely inﬂuential function, are studied in Section 4. In Section 5, we
investigate several unanimous inﬂuence functions and study their properties. Sections 6
and 7 concern ﬁxed points and linear inﬂuence functions, respectively. Section 8 is devoted
to the concept of a negative inﬂuence. In Section 9, we present some concluding remarks.
2 The positive inﬂuence index in the generalized framework
Before deﬁning the model, we introduce several notations for convenience. First of all,
cardinality of sets S,T,... will be denoted by the corresponding lower case s,t,.... We
often omit braces for sets, e.g., {k,m}, N \{j}, S ∪{j} will be written km, N \j, S ∪j,
etc. We consider a social network with the set of players (agents, actors) denoted by
N = {1,...,n}. Each player has a continuum of actions to choose, i.e., we assume that
the set of actions is an interval [a,b], where a,b ∈ R and a < b. Each player has an
inclination to choose one of the actions, i.e., by the inclination of a player we mean the
particular action from [a,b] the player wants to choose. Let im denote the inclination of
player m ∈ N, i.e., im ∈ [a,b]. Let I = [a,b]n denote the set of all n-inclination vectors
i = (i1,...,in) ∈ [a,b]n.
It is assumed that players may inﬂuence each other, and due to the inﬂuence in the
network, the ﬁnal decision of a player may be diﬀerent from his original inclination. In
other words, each inclination vector i ∈ I is transformed into a decision vector B(i), where
B : I → I,i  → B(i) is the inﬂuence function. The decision vector B(i) is an n-vector
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The set of all inﬂuence functions with N will be denoted by B.
A coalition ∅  = S ⊂ N of players is assumed to be able to inﬂuence an outside
agent j / ∈ S only if all members of that coalition have the same inclination. Hence, when
measuring inﬂuence of S on j, ﬁrst we can select the n-inclination vectors under which
all players in S have the inclination to choose the same action. Such n-inclination vectors
form the set
IS := {i ∈ [a,b]
n : ∀m,p ∈ S [im = ip]}. (1)
Next, we can consider only (n − s + 1)-inclination vectors consisting of the inclinations
of the players outside S and one player [S] which represents all the members of coalition
S. Such a (n − s + 1)-inclination vector will be denoted by i[S] ∈ [a,b]n−s+1. We use the
notation iS ∈ [a,b] for the inclination of the members of S both under i ∈ IS and under
i[S] ∈ [a,b]n−s+1. We will say that the inclination vectors i and i[S] are corresponding to
each other (or that one of them corresponds to another one) if for each player m ∈ N \S,
his inclinations under i and under i[S] are the same, and all players in S have the same
inclination iS under i. In other words, i[S] ∈ [a,b]n−s+1 is formed from i ∈ IS by merging
all the players in S into one player [S].
Let for each ∅  = S ⊂ N and j ∈ N \ S
I
[S]
S→j := {i
[S] ∈ [a,b]
n−s+1 : ij  = iS}. (2)
I
[S]
S→j denotes the set of all (n − s + 1)-inclination vectors of potential positive inﬂuence
of S on j. These are all the (n − s + 1)-inclination vectors for which the inclination of
player j is diﬀerent from the inclination of coalition S (or equivalently, diﬀerent from the
inclination iS of player [S]).
Let B : I → I be a given inﬂuence function in an n-player network. Let ∅  = S ⊂ N and
j ∈ N \S. If we consider the set [S]∪(N \S) only, then we can construct a corresponding
inﬂuence function B[S] : [a,b]n−s+1 → [a,b]n−s+1 such that for each m ∈ N \ S, and for
each pair of corresponding inclination vectors i ∈ IS and i[S] ∈ [a,b]n−s+1
(B
[S](i
[S]))m := (B(i))m (3)
and (B[S](i[S]))[S] is left undeﬁned. Note that while we consider the inclination vectors in
which all players in S have the same inclination iS, the decisions of the players from S
may be diﬀerent from each other.
Next, for each ∅  = S ⊂ N, j ∈ N \S, and B ∈ B, we deﬁne the set of all (n−s+1)-
inclination vectors of positive inﬂuence of S on j under given B as
I
∗[S]
S→j(B) := {i
[S] ∈ I
[S]
S→j : |(B
[S](i
[S]))j − iS| < |ij − iS|}
which, by virtue of (3) and the fact that j / ∈ S, can be written in a simpler way as:
I
∗[S]
S→j(B) = {i
[S] ∈ I
[S]
S→j : |(B(i))j − iS| < |ij − iS|}. (4)
The set I
∗[S]
S→j(B) consists therefore of all the (n−s+1)-inclination vectors of potential
positive inﬂuence of S on j such that the diﬀerence between the inclinations of j and of
S is greater than the diﬀerence between the decision of player j and the inclination of S.
Consequently, we identify the cases where player j chooses an action which is closer to
the inclination of coalition S than his inclination was.
5Deﬁnition 1 Given B ∈ B, for each ∅  = S ⊂ N, j ∈ N \S, the positive inﬂuence index
of coalition S on player j under the inﬂuence function B is deﬁned as
D(B,S → j) :=
 
I
∗[S]
S→j(B) [|ij − iS| − |(B(i))j − iS|] di[S]
 
I
[S]
S→j
|ij − iS| di[S] . (5)
Note that D(B,S → j) exists and D(B,S → j) ∈ [0,1]. Moreover, it is related to the
possibility positive inﬂuence index deﬁned in the model of inﬂuence in which every player
has a ﬁnite totally ordered set of possible actions; see Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010b,
[18]).
Remark 1 If I = [a,b]n, then for each ∅  = S ⊂ N and j ∈ N \ S
 
I
[S]
S→j
|ij − iS| di
[S] =
(b − a)n−s+2
3
. (6)
Proof:
 
I
[S]
S→j
|ij − iS| di
[S] = 2
  b
a
...
  b
a
  b
a
  ij
a
(ij − iS) diS dij dik1 ... dikn−s−1
= 2
  b
a
...
  b
a
  b
a
 
ij   iS −
i2
S
2
 iS=ij
iS=a
dij dik1 ... dikn−s−1
=
  b
a
...
  b
a
  b
a
(ij − a)
2 dij dik1 ... dikn−s−1
=
1
3
  b
a
...
  b
a
(b − a)
3 dik1 ... dikn−s−1 =
(b − a)n−s+2
3
￿
When measuring inﬂuence of a coalition on a player, we assume that all members of
that coalition have the same inclination and we treat the coalition just as one player.
Consequently, there is a relation between the inﬂuence index D(B,S → j) of coalition
S on player j in the network with n players, and the inﬂuence index D(B[S],[S] → j) of
player [S] on j in the corresponding network with n−s+1 players. From (3) and (5) we
get the following:
Remark 2 Given B ∈ B, for each ∅  = S ⊂ N and j ∈ N \ S
D(B,S → j) = D(B
[S],[S] → j). (7)
3 Examples
3.1 The two-player examples
In order to illustrate the concepts introduced in Section 2, we present a very simple 2-
player example, i.e., N = {1,2}. We skip the upper index [S], because for n = 2 and all
∅  = S ⊂ N, we have N = [S] ∪ (N \ S).
6Suppose that a two-member committee has to evaluate a scientiﬁc project and decide
about the amount of funding for the project. Each of the two referees has to write his
report and propose an amount of funding, i.e., to choose a percent (from 0% till 100 %)
of the grant demanded by the project coordinator to be assigned to the project. Before
preparing the reports, the referees discuss with each other the project. Each referee knows
the inclination of the another one, and such a pre-decision discussion is a good moment
for exercising the inﬂuence between the referees.
We can assume that each player has to choose an action from the interval [0,1], where
each action means a fraction of the demanded grant. In particular, the actions 0, 0.5 and
1 denote assigning no grant to the project, giving half of the requested grant, and giving
the whole demanded amount, respectively. The set of inclination vectors is then equal to
I = [0,1]2.
We consider the positive inﬂuence of player 1 on player 2, and therefore
I1→2 = {(i1,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2 : i2  = i1}.
These sets are presented in the ﬁgures below. The set of all inclination vectors I consists
of all the points (i1,i2) of the square, while the set I1→2 consists of all the points of the
square without the diagonal i1 = i2.
-
6
r
0
r
1
r 1
i1
i2 I = [0,1]2
-
6
0
r
1
r 1
i1
i2 I1→2
First, let us assume that the inﬂuence function B is deﬁned as follows:
B(i1,i2) =
 
i1,
i1 + i2
2
 
for each (i1,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2, (8)
which means that player 1 always follows his own inclination, while the decision of player
2 is a middle point between the inclinations of the two players. Consequently, if their
inclinations are not equal, then the decision of player 2 is closer to the inclination of
player 1 than his inclination was. By virtue of (6), we have:
 
I1→2
|i2 − i1| di =
1
3
.
I
∗
1→2(B) = {i ∈ I1→2 :
       
i1 + i2
2
− i1
        < |i2−i1|} = {i ∈ I1→2 :
|i2 − i1|
2
< |i2−i1|} = I1→2.
If we calculate the positive inﬂuence index D(B,1 → 2) of player 1 on player 2 under the
inﬂuence function B, then from (5) and (8) we have
 
I∗
1→2(B)
[|i2 − i1| − |(B(i))2 − i1|] di =
1
2
 
 
I1→2
|i2 − i1| di
7and therefore
D(B,1 → 2) =
1
2
.
Let us consider now a negative inﬂuence and assume that the decision of player 2 is
as extreme with respect to the inclination of player 1 as possible, that is,
(B
′(i1,i2))1 = i1, (B
′(i1,i2))2 =
 
0 if i1 ≥ 1
2
1 if 0 ≤ i1 < 1
2
for each (i1,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2. (9)
In this case, I∗
1→2(B′) = ∅, and therefore D(B′,1 → 2) = 0.
Another inﬂuence function which we consider is deﬁned as follows:
(B
′′(i1,i2))1 = i1, (B
′′(i1,i2))2 =

 
 
i2 if |i2 − i1| ≤ 1
2
i1 + 1
2 if i2 > i1 + 1
2
i1 − 1
2 if i2 < i1 − 1
2
for each (i1,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2.
(10)
According to (10), if the diﬀerence between the inclinations of players 1 and 2 is not
greater than 1
2, then player 2 decides according to his own inclination, otherwise the
decision of player 2 is of an exact distance 1
2 from the inclination of player 1. It is a
kind of a partial inﬂuence meaning that player 2 likes to decides according to his own
inclination if his inclination is not that far from the inclination of player 1, and he ‘adjusts’
his inclination if there is a rather serious diﬀerence between the inclinations of the both
players. We have
I
∗
1→2(B
′′) = {(i1,i2) ∈ I1→2 : |(B
′′(i))2 − i1| < |i2 − i1|}
=
 
(i1,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2 : i2 > i1 +
1
2
 
∪
 
(i1,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2 : i2 < i1 −
1
2
 
.
The ﬁgure below presents the set I∗
1→2(B′′) with the inﬂuence function B′′ deﬁned
in (10), and it consists of all the points (i1,i2) of the two triangles without the lines
i2 = i1 + 1
2 and i2 = i1 − 1
2.
-
6
r
0
r
1
r 1
r
0.5
r 0.5
i1
i2 I∗
1→2(B′′)
Let us calculate the positive inﬂuence index D(B′′,1 → 2) of player 1 on player 2 under
the inﬂuence function B′′.
8 
I∗
1→2(B′′)
[|i2 − i1| − |(B
′′(i))2 − i1|] di =
 
{i∈[0,1]2:i2>i1+ 1
2}
[|i2 − i1| − |(B
′′(i))2 − i1|] di +
+
 
{i∈[0,1]2:i2<i1− 1
2}
[|i2 − i1| − |(B
′′(i))2 − i1|] di =
=
  1
2
0
  1
i1+ 1
2
(i2 − i1 −
1
2
) di2 di1 +
  1
1
2
  i1− 1
2
0
(i1 − i2 −
1
2
) di2 di1 =
1
24
.
Hence,
D(B
′′,1 → 2) =
1
8
.
Finally, we analyze the following family of the inﬂuence functions:
B
x(i1,i2) = (i1,x) for each (i1,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2, (11)
where x ∈ [0,1]. This means that the ﬁrst player always decides according to his own
inclination, and the second player always chooses the action x. There can be several
reasons for choosing always the same action x. For instance, a certain ﬁxed percent of
funding is coherent with a policy of the given foundation, or the experience shows that a
certain percent usually represents well real needs to cover expenses of an average project
within the given framework, etc. In this case, we cannot really speak of the inﬂuence of
player 1 on player 2, but rather of a kind of a ‘success’ rate of player 1, meaning that
player 2 makes a decision which is closer to the inclination of player 1 than his inclination
was. Nevertheless, we like to calculate the inﬂuence index for this example, because such
a ‘constant decision’ is not that rare in real life situations. Moreover, we like to show
which decision of a referee makes the another referee ‘most successful’. In this example,
we have
I
∗
1→2(B
x) = {i ∈ I1→2 : |x − i1| < |i2 − i1|}.
We can distinguish four possible cases when solving the inequality |x − i1| < |i2 − i1|
in the set I∗
1→2(Bx):
– Case I: If i1 ≤ x and i2 > i1, then i2 > x;
– Case II: If i1 ≤ x and i2 < i1, then i2 < 2i1 − x;
– Case III: If i1 > x and i2 > i1, then i2 > 2i1 − x;
– Case IV: If i1 > x and i2 < i1, then i2 < x.
The ﬁgure below presents the set I∗
1→2(Bx) with the inﬂuence function Bx deﬁned in (11).
This set I∗
1→2(Bx) consists of four subsets given by the cases listed above.
-
6
0
r
1
r 1
r
x
r
x
2
r x
I
II
IV
III
i1
i2 I∗
1→2(Bx)
9The subsets of I∗
1→2(Bx) corresponding to the four cases are the following:
I
I
1→2(B
x) = {(i1,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2 : [0 ≤ i1 ≤ x ∧ x < i2 ≥ 1]}
I
II
1→2(B
x) =
 
(i1,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2 :
 x
2
< i1 ≤ x ∧ 0 ≤ i2 < 2i1 − x
  
I
III
1→2(B
x) =
 
(i1,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2 :
 
x < i1 <
1 + x
2
∧ 2i1 − x < i2 ≤ 1
  
I
IV
1→2(B
x) =
 
(i1,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2 : [x < i1 ≤ 1 ∧ 0 ≤ i2 < x]
 
.
Let us calculate the positive inﬂuence index D(Bx,1 → 2) of player 1 on player 2
under the inﬂuence function Bx.
D(B
x,1 → 2) =
 
I∗
1→2(Bx) [|i2 − i1| − |(Bx(i))2 − i1|] di
 
I1→2 |i2 − i1| di
= 3
 
I∗
1→2(Bx)
[|i2 − i1| − |x − i1|] di
= 3
 
L∈{I,II,III,IV }
 
IL
1→2(Bx)
[|i2 − i1| − |x − i1|] di
 
II
1→2(Bx)
[|i2 − i1| − |x − i1|] di =
  x
0
  1
x
(i2 − x) di2 di1 =
  x
0
 
i2
2
2
− x   i2
 i2=1
i2=x
di1
=
  x
0
 
1
2
− x +
1
2
x
2
 
di1 =
1
2
x(x − 1)
2
 
III
1→2(Bx)
[|i2 − i1| − |x − i1|] di =
  x
x
2
  2i1−x
0
(2i1 − i2 − x) di2 di1
=
  x
x
2
 
2i1   i2 −
i2
2
2
− x   i2
 i2=2i1−x
i2=0
di1
= 2
  x
x
2
 
i1 −
x
2
 2
di1 =
1
12
x
3
 
IIII
1→2(Bx)
[|i2 − i1| − |x − i1|] di =
  1+x
2
x
  1
2i1−x
(i2 − 2i1 + x) di2 di1
=
  1+x
2
x
 
i2
2
2
− 2i1   i2 + x   i2
 i2=1
i2=2i1−x
di1 =
1
12
(1 − x)
3
 
IIV
1→2(Bx)
[|i2 − i1| − |x − i1|] di =
  1
x
  x
0
(x − i2) di2 di1
=
  1
x
 
x
2 −
x2
2
 
di1 =
1
2
x
2(1 − x).
10Hence,
D(B
x,1 → 2) = 3
 
1
2
x(x − 1)
2 +
1
12
x
3 +
1
12
(1 − x)
3 +
1
2
x
2(1 − x)
 
=
1
4
(1 + 3x − 3x
2).
Note that, for instance, for x = 0 the analysis is reduced to the case III, while for
x = 1 we have the case II, and
D(B
0,1 → 2) = D(B
1,1 → 2) =
1
4
.
The ﬁgures below present I∗
1→2(B0) and I∗
1→2(B1).
-
6
r
0
r
1
r 1
i1
i2
r
0.5
I∗
1→2(B0)
-
6
0
r
1
r 1
i1
i2
r
0.5
I∗
1→2(B1)
Note that
1
4
≤ D(B
x,1 → 2) ≤
7
16
for all x ∈ [0,1]
and
arg max
x∈[0,1]
D(B
x,1 → 2) =
1
2
which means that the positive inﬂuence index of player 1 on player 2 is maximal if player
2 proposes to assign 50% of the requested budget to the evaluated project, no matter
what the inclinations of the both referees are.
3.2 The three-player example
In order to illustrate the relation presented in Section 2 between the inﬂuence indices
in two networks with diﬀerent set of players, let us consider a three-player example. It
is similar to the 2-player example presented in Section 3.1, except that the committee
evaluating a scientiﬁc project consists now of 3 referees, that is, N = {1,2,3}. Suppose
S = {1,3}, j = 2, and we measure the inﬂuence of coalition S on player j. We have
I = [0,1]3, that is, i = (i1,i2,i3), i[S] = (i[13],i2). Moreover,
I13 = {(i1,i2,i3) ∈ [0,1]
3 : i1 = i3]}
I
[13]
13→2 = {(i13,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2 : i2  = i13}
11The following picture shows the respective sets of inﬂuence vectors: I, I13, and I
[13]
13→2.
i1,i[13]
i2
i3
I13 I
[13]
13→2
I = [0,1]3
We deﬁne the inﬂuence function B : [0,1]3 → [0,1]3 as follows:
B(i1,i2,i3) =
 
i1,
i1 + 2i2 + i3
4
,i2
 
for each (i1,i2,i3) ∈ [0,1]
3 (12)
and then the corresponding inﬂuence function B[13] : [0,1]2 → [0,1]2 is equal to:
B
[13](i13,i2) =
 
i13,
i13 + i2
2
 
for each (i13,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2.
Note that this inﬂuence function is equal to the inﬂuence function B deﬁned by (8) in
Section 3.1. Moreover,
I
∗[13]
13→2(B) =
 
(i13,i2) ∈ I
[13]
13→2 :
       
i13 + i2
2
− i13
        < |i2 − i13|
 
= I
[13]
13→2.
We get therefore
D(B,13 → 2) = D(B
[13],[13] → 2) =
1
2
.
4 The set of followers and the purely inﬂuential functions
Similar as in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010b, [18]), we deﬁne the concepts of follower
and perfect follower of a given coalition. A follower of a given coalition of agents is a
player whose decision is never farther from the inclination of the coalition in question
than his inclination was. A player who always decides according to the inclination of the
coalition in question is called a perfect follower of that coalition.
Deﬁnition 2 Let ∅  = S ⊆ N and B ∈ B. The follower function FB : 2N → 2N is deﬁned
as follows
FB(S) := {j ∈ N : ∀i ∈ IS [[ij  = iS ⇒ |(B(i))j−iS| < |ij−iS|] ∧ [ij = iS ⇒ (B(i))j = iS]]}
(13)
where FB(S) is the set of followers of S under B, and FB(∅) := ∅.
The perfect follower function F
per
B (S) : 2N → 2N is given by
F
per
B (S) := {j ∈ N : ∀i ∈ IS [(B(i))j = iS]}, (14)
where F
per
B (S) is the set of perfect followers of S under B.
12Of course, each perfect follower is also a follower, i.e., for each B ∈ B and S ⊆ N,
F
per
B (S) ⊆ FB(S).
The next proposition studies the properties of these functions. The analogous result
for an inﬂuence model in which players have a ﬁnite totally ordered set of actions is given
in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010b, [18]). For the proofs, see [18].
Proposition 1 Let B ∈ B. Then the following holds:
(i) Whenever S ∩ T = ∅, FB(S) ∩ FB(T) = ∅.
(ii) FB is an isotone function (S ⊆ S′ implies FB(S) ⊆ FB(S′)).
Consequently, if FB(N) = ∅, then FB ≡ ∅.
(iii) For each j ∈ F
per
B (S) \ S, D(B,S → j) = 1.
Assume FB is not identically the empty set. Similarly as in the multi-action model,
we deﬁne the kernel K(B) of B
K(B) := {S ∈ 2
N : FB(S)  = ∅, and S
′ ⊂ S ⇒ FB(S
′) = ∅}.
which is the set of “true” inﬂuential coalitions, and a purely inﬂuential function which,
in the framework of inﬂuence with a continuum of actions, has similar properties as the
purely inﬂuential function for the model with a ﬁnite totally ordered set of actions (see
Grabisch and Rusinowska, 2010b, [18]).
Deﬁnition 3 Let S,T be two disjoint nonempty subsets of N. The inﬂuence function
B ∈ B is said to be a purely inﬂuential function of S upon T if it satisﬁes for all i ∈ IS:
(B(i))j =
 
iS if j ∈ T
ij otherwise.
(15)
The set of such functions is denoted by BS→T.
A purely inﬂuential function B of S upon T is said to be a canonical pure inﬂuential
function of S upon T if additionally B(i) = i for each i ∈ I \ IS. Such a function is
denoted by BS→T.
Proposition 2 Let S,T be two disjoint nonempty subsets of N. Then the following holds:
(i) For all B ∈ BS→T, FB(S) ⊇ S ∪ T, and F
per
B (S) = S ∪ T.
(ii) For each B ∈ BS→T and j ∈ N \ S,
D(B,S → j) =
 
1 if j ∈ T
0 if j ∈ N \ (S ∪ T)
(16)
Example 1 For the example presented in Section 3.1, we have
FB(1) = FB(N) = N, FB(2) = ∅, F
per
B (1) = F
per
B (N) = {1}, K(B) = {1}.
Moreover, for each   B ∈ {B′,B′′,Bx}, and for each x ∈ [0,1], we have
F   B(S) = F
per
  B (S) for each S ⊆ N, F   B(N) = F   B(1) = {1}, F   B(2) = ∅, and K(   B) = {1}.
135 The unanimous inﬂuence functions
When we describe phenomena of a positive inﬂuence in terms of a corresponding inﬂuence
function, it is usually suﬃcient to restrict the analysis to unanimous functions.
Deﬁnition 4 The inﬂuence function B ∈ B is unanimous if B(x,x,...,x) = (x,x,...,x)
for each x ∈ [a,b], and unanimous on the boundaries if this holds only for x = a and
x = b.
Obviously, inﬂuence functions depicting a negative (opposite) inﬂuence should not
satisfy the unanimous properties. In Section 3.1, the inﬂuence functions B and B′′ deﬁned
in (8) and (10), respectively, are unanimous, as well as the function B presented in Section
3.2 (see (12)).
In this section, we present several other examples of inﬂuence functions that are unan-
imous. These inﬂuence functions which have been introduced in Grabisch and Rusinowska
(2009b, 2010b, [16,18]), are now generalized for the inﬂuence model with a continuum
of actions. We investigate the properties of these functions and compare them with our
results on the analogous functions in the model with a ﬁnite totally ordered set of actions.
In particular, for the inﬂuence functions analyzed, we determine the follower functions,
the kernels, and the inﬂuence indices for some particular cases. Basic properties of the
inﬂuence functions deﬁned for the continuum case appear to be the same as the properties
of the analogous inﬂuence functions deﬁned for the model with a ﬁnite totally ordered set
of actions. The proofs of propositions presented below (Propositions 3, 4, 5, and 6) are
analogous to the proofs of the corresponding results in the model with a totally ordered
set of actions; see Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010b, [18]).
The ﬁrst inﬂuence function we like to mention is the majority function. If the players
decide according to this function, then in case a majority of players has an inclination
x, all players decide for x, and if not, then each player decides according to his own
inclination.
Deﬁnition 5 (The majority function)
Let n ≥ t > ⌊n
2⌋, and introduce for any i ∈ I and x ∈ [a,b], the set
i
x := {k ∈ N : ik = x}. (17)
The majority inﬂuence function Maj
[t] ∈ B is deﬁned by
 
Maj
[t](i)
 
j
:=
 
x, if ∃x ∈ [a,b] [|ix| ≥ t]
ij, otherwise
, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ N. (18)
One can show that:
Proposition 3 Let n ≥ t > ⌊n
2⌋ and consider the majority function Maj
[t]. Then the
following holds:
(i) For each ∅  = S ⊂ N such that s ≥ t, and for each j ∈ N \ S, D(Maj
[t],S → j) = 1.
If t = n, then for each ∅  = S ⊂ N and j ∈ N \ S, D(Maj
[t],S → j) = 0.
(ii) For each S ⊆ N,
FMaj[t](S) =

 
 
N, if s ≥ t
S, if n − t < s < t
∅, if s ≤ n − t.
(19)
14(iii) The kernel is K(Maj
[t]) = {S ⊆ N : |S| = n − t + 1}.
Another inﬂuence function analyzed in this paper is the guru function which simply
means that when a guru exists, every player always follows the guru.
Deﬁnition 6 (The guru function)
Let   k ∈ N be a particular player called the guru. The guru inﬂuence function Gur
[  k] ∈ B
is deﬁned by
(Gur
[  k](i))j = i  k, ∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ N. (20)
The following holds:
Proposition 4 Let   k ∈ N and consider the guru inﬂuence function Gur
[  k]. Then the
following holds:
(i) For each ∅  = S ⊆ N such that   k ∈ S, and for each j ∈ N \ S, D(Gur
[  k],S → j) = 1.
(ii) For each S ⊆ N,
F
Gur[  k](S) =
 
N, if   k ∈ S
∅, if   k / ∈ S.
(21)
(iii) The kernel is K(Gur
[  k]) = {  k}.
(iv) Gur
[  k] is the unique purely inﬂuential function of   k upon N\  k, i.e., B  k→N\  k = {Gur
[  k]}.
Also the identity function, according to which every player always follows himself, can
be seen as a kind of a particular inﬂuence function.
Deﬁnition 7 (The identity function)
The identity function Id ∈ B is deﬁned by
Id(i) = i, ∀i ∈ I. (22)
It is not surprising that the identity function has the following properties:
Proposition 5 Let us consider the identity function Id. Then the following holds:
(i) For each ∅  = S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S, D(Id,S → j) = 0.
(ii) For each S ⊆ N, FId(S) = S.
(iii) The kernel is K(Id) = {{k},k ∈ N}.
Finally, we like to mention the mass psychology function. According to this inﬂuence
function, if there is a suﬃciently high number of players with inclination x, none of these
players will decide diﬀerently than x, and they will possibly attract other players to choose
action x.
Deﬁnition 8 (The mass psychology function)
Let t ∈ (0,n] and x ∈ [a,b]. Functions B ∈ B satisfying for each i ∈ I
if |i
x| ≥ t, then (B(i))
x ⊇ i
x (23)
are called mass psychology inﬂuence functions. We denote by B[x,t] the set of such inﬂuence
functions.
15One can prove that:
Proposition 6 Let t ∈ (0,n] and x ∈ [a,b] be ﬁxed, and consider any inﬂuence function
B in B[x,t]. Then the following holds:
(i) There exists B ∈ B[x,t] such that for each ∅  = S ⊆ N and j ∈ N\S, D(B,S → j) = 0.
(ii) For each ∅  = S ⊆ N such that s > n −t, t > 1, and j ∈ N \ S, there exists B ∈ B[x,t]
such that D(B,S → j) = 1.
(iii) For each S ⊆ N, FB(S) ⊆ S if s ≤ n − t. Moreover, there exists B ∈ B[x,t] such that
for each S ⊆ N, FB(S) = S.
6 Fixed points under an inﬂuence function
We are also interested in determining ﬁxed points in the framework of inﬂuence, that is,
such inclination vectors which, despite the inﬂuence between players, do not change in
the decision process.
Deﬁnition 9 An inclination vector i ∈ I is a ﬁxed point under B ∈ B if B(i) = i.
The set of ﬁxed points under B will be denoted by IFP(B), i.e.,
I
FP(B) := {i ∈ I : B(i) = i}. (24)
Example 2 For the inﬂuence function B deﬁned by (8) in Section 3.1, the set of ﬁxed
points is
I
FP(B) = {(i1,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2 : i1 = i2}.
Note that, for this example
I
FP(B) = I \ (I
∗
1→2(B) ∪ I
∗
2→1(B)).
For the function B deﬁned by (12) in a three-player example presented in Section 3.2, we
have
I
FP(B) = {(i1,i2,i3) ∈ [0,1]
3 : i1 = i2 = i3}.
Example 3 Let us calculate the sets of ﬁxed points for the remaining functions of Section
3.1, i.e., the functions B′, B′′, and Bx deﬁned by (9), (10), and (11), respectively. We
have
I
FP(B
′) =
 
(i1,0) : i1 ≥
1
2
 
∪
 
(i1,1) : 0 ≤ i1 <
1
2
 
I
FP(B
′′) =
 
(i1,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2 : i1 −
1
2
≤ i2 ≤ i1 +
1
2
 
I
FP(B
x) = {(i1,x) : 0 ≤ i1 ≤ 1}.
Note that
I
FP(B
′′) = I \ (I
∗
1→2(B
′′) ∪ I
∗
2→1(B
′′)).
Example 4 For the unanimous functions presented in Section 5, the sets of ﬁxed points
are equal to
I
FP(Id) = I, I
FP(Gur
[  k]) = {i ∈ I : ∀j,k ∈ N [ij = ik]}
I
FP(Maj
[t]) = {i ∈ I : ∀j,k ∈ N [ij = ik]} ∪ {i ∈ I : ∀x ∈ [a,b] [|i
x| < t]}.
16Since now we will assume for simplicity that [0,1] is the interval of possible actions,
i.e., I = [0,1]. Moreover, let IS→j denote the set of all n-inclination vectors of potential
positive inﬂuence of S on j, i.e.,
IS→j := {i ∈ IS : ij  = iS} (25)
and let I∗
S→j(B) be the set of all n-inclination vectors of positive inﬂuence of S on j under
B, i.e.,
I
∗
S→j(B) := {i ∈ IS : [ij  = iS ∧ |(B(i))j − iS| < |ij − iS|]}. (26)
Proposition 7 Let B ∈ B be an inﬂuence function, IFP(B) denote the set of ﬁxed points
under B.
(i) Then
I
FP(B) ⊂ I \
 
S,j
I
∗
S→j(B) (27)
but the equality does NOT hold.
(ii) If B is unanimous, then
{i ∈ I : ∀j,k ∈ N [ij = ik]} ⊂ I
FP(B) (28)
but the equality does NOT hold. Moreover, if B is unanimous on the boundaries, then
0 and 1 are ﬁxed points under B.
Proof: (i) Suppose that the inclusion does hold, i.e., there is i ∈ I such that i ∈ IFP(B)
and i ∈
 
S,j I∗
S→j(B). Hence, B(i) = i and there is S and j such that i ∈ I∗
S→j(B). This
means that ij  = iS and |(B(i))j − iS| < |ij − iS|, while (B(i))j = ij, a contradiction.
In order to show that the equality does not hold take, for instance, the function B′
deﬁned by (9). We have I∗
1→2(B′) = I∗
2→1(B′) = ∅, and by virtue of Example 3, we have
IFP(B′)  = I.
(ii) Take an arbitrary i ∈ I such that ij = ik for each j,k ∈ N. Since B is unanimous,
B(i) = B(ij,...,ij) = (ij,...,ij) = i. In order to see that the equality does not hold, take
the identity function Id, i.e., Id(i) = i for each i ∈ I, which is an unanimous function, and
IFP(Id) = I. By deﬁnition, 0 and 1 are ﬁxed points if B is unanimous on the boundaries.
￿
Deﬁnition 10 We say that for a given distance d on [0,1]n, B is contracting if for all
i,i′ ∈ I we have
d(B(i) − B(i
′)) < d(i,i
′).
Obviously, if B is unanimous on the boundaries, then it cannot be contracting. The
Banach ﬁxed point theorem says that every contracting function B has a unique ﬁxed
point.
177 Linear inﬂuence functions
An important particular case is when an inﬂuence function B is linear, that is, it can be
written as a matrix, and then we write Bi instead of B(i). We assume that I = [0,1].
Example 5 The inﬂuence function B deﬁned by (8) in Section 3.1 is linear. For this
function, the corresponding matrix is equal to
B =
 
1 0
1
2
1
2
 
.
Also the function B deﬁned by (12) in a three-player example presented in Section 3.2 is
linear, and
B =


1 0 0
1
4
1
2
1
4
0 1 0

.
The guru inﬂuence function Gur
[  k] and the identity function Id are obviously also linear,
and their corresponding matrices are equal to
Gur
[  k] =


0 ... 1 ... 0
... ... ... ... ...
0 ... 1 ... 0

 Id =

 

1 0 ... 0
0 1 ... 0
... ... ... ...
0 0 ... 1

 

i.e., Gur
[  k] has the form
bj  k = 1 and bjk = 0 for k  =   k, j ∈ N
and Id has the form
bjj = 1 and bjk = 0 for k  = j, j ∈ N.
Linear inﬂuence functions have nice features, among which:
– If B is unanimous on the boundaries, then B satisﬁes
 n
k=1 bjk = 1, since B1 = 1.
This is a stochastic matrix.
– i is a ﬁxed point if and only if i is a solution of the system Bi = i, i.e., i is an
eigenvector of B associated with eigenvalue 1.
We consider inﬂuence functions unanimous on the boundaries (note that B0 = 0 is true
for any matrix). We have immediately:
Lemma 1 B unanimous on 1 if and only if B unanimous if and only if
 n
k=1 bjk = 1
for each row bj.
Proposition 8 Let B be unanimous on the boundary 1. Take S ⊆ N, j  ∈ S. S has a
positive inﬂuence on j for every i ∈ IS→j if and only if |bjj| < 1 and bjk = 0 for all
k ∈ N \ (S ∪ j). Moreover, in this case
D(B,S → j) = 1 − |bjj|. (29)
18Proof: Let B be arbitrary. There is positive inﬂuence of S on j for i ∈ IS→j if
|(Bi)j − iS| < |ij − iS|. (30)
By Lemma 1 we ﬁnd
(Bi)j − iS = iS
 
k∈S
bjk +
 
k ∈S
bjkik − iS
= iS
 
−
 
k ∈S
bjk
 
+
 
k ∈S
bjkik
= bjj(ij − iS) +
 
k ∈S
k =j
bjk(ik − iS).
We have to ﬁnd conditions on B such that for all i ∈ IS→j, (30) holds, i.e.
|bjj(ij − iS) +
 
k ∈S
k =j
bjk(ik − iS)| < |ij − iS|. (31)
We have
|bjj(ij − iS) +
 
k ∈S
k =j
bjk(ik − iS)| ≤ |bjj(ij − iS)| + |
 
k ∈S
k =j
bjk(ik − iS)|.
Moreover,
 
k ∈S
k =j
bjk(ik −iS) ≤
 
k ∈S
k =j
|bjk| since −1 ≤ ik −iS ≤ 1 for all k  = j,k  ∈ S, and
equality can be attained by choosing i with ik − iS = 1. Therefore, for every i ∈ IS→j
0 ≤ |bjj(ij − iS) +
 
k ∈S
k =j
bjk(ik − iS)| ≤ |bjj(ij − iS)| +
 
k ∈S
k =j
|bjk|.
The right hand expression and |ij −iS| being continuous functions of ij on [0,1], we have
by (31)
0 ≤ lim
ij→iS
 
|bjj(ij − iS)| +
 
k ∈S
k =j
|bjk|
 
≤ lim
ij→iS
|ij − iS|
which becomes
0 ≤
 
k ∈S
k =j
|bjk| ≤ 0
and yields bjk = 0 for every k ∈ N \ (S ∪ j). Substituting into (31) yields
|bjj(ij − iS)| < |ij − iS|
implying |bjj| < 1.
Let us take B satisfying the above conditions. Then
(Bi)j − iS = bjjij +
 
k∈S
bjkiS − iS = bjj(ij − iS).
19Note that for such a B we have I∗
S→j(B) = IS→j. Therefore
D(B,S → j) =
 
I
∗[S]
S→j(B)
 
|ij − iS| − |(Bi)j − iS|
 
di[S]
 
I
[S]
S→j
|ij − iS|di[S]
=
 
I
[S]
S→j
|ij − iS|
 
1 − |bjj|
 
di[S]
 
I
[S]
S→j
|ij − iS|di[S]
= 1 − |bjj|.
￿
Remark 3 Note that:
(i) The result is intuitively unsurprising. Also, for such B’s, j is a follower of S.
(ii) The expression
(Bi)j − iS = bjj(ij − iS)
shows that:
– If bjj = 0, then (Bi)j = iS, i.e., the inﬂuence is full and j is a perfect follower of
S.
– If bjj > 0, then sgn
 
(Bi)j −iS
 
= sgn(ij −iS), which means that due to inﬂuence,
the decision of j is always going closer to the inclination of S, i.e., is in between
the original inclination ij and the inclination of S.
(iii) The condition that B has to fulﬁll for the inﬂuence of S on j concerns only row j
of the matrix. Therefore, it is very easy to build/customize a matrix B such that for
some players the inﬂuencing coalition is speciﬁed (see also Corollary 1 below).
Example 6 If we apply equation (29) of Proposition 8 to the matrices of the guru
function and the identity function, then we get
D(Gur
[  k],S → j) = 1 for each ∅  = S ⊆ N with   k ∈ S, j ∈ N \ S
D(Id,S → j) = 0 for each ∅  = S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S
which is coherent with the results reported in Propositions 4 and 5, respectively. Also
applying Proposition 8 to the matrices of the inﬂuence function deﬁned by (8), and the
function deﬁned by (12) in a three-player example, gives us the same inﬂuence indices
as the ones calculated in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, respectively, i.e., D(B,1 → 2) = 1
2 and
D(B,13 → 2) = 1
2.
The following is also an immediate consequence of Proposition 8.
Corollary 1 Let S,T be two disjoint coalitions. A matrix B of the form (see ﬁgure below)
bjj = 1 and bjk = 0 for k  = j, j  ∈ T ∪ S
bjk = 0 for k  ∈ S, j ∈ T
bjk = 0 for k  ∈ S, j ∈ S
is a purely inﬂuential function of S upon T.
20Note that the converse is false, because for such functions nothing is speciﬁed when i is
outside IS (in particular they need not be linear). With the above matrix, the behavior of
the function outside IS is speciﬁed. In particular, the canonical purely inﬂuential function
of S upon T is not of this form, because outside IS, it should be the identity matrix.
S T
T
S
1
We give some general considerations on BUL, the set of matrices representing unani-
mous linear inﬂuence functions:
B
UL := {B ∈ R
(n2) :
n  
j=1
bij = 1, i = 1...,n}.
(i) BUL is convex polyhedron without vertices (because less equations than variables).
Vectors V deﬁned by vij = 1,vik = −1 for some i,j,k, j  = k, and 0 otherwise are
extremal rays (in fact lines), since if B ∈ BUL then for any α ∈ R, B + αV ∈ BUL.
(ii) BUL is closed under matrix product. Indeed, if B,B′ ∈ BUL, element cij of BB′ reads
cij =
 n
k=1 bikb′
kj. Therefore
n  
j=1
cij =
n  
j=1
n  
k=1
bikb
′
kj =
 
k
bik
 
j
b
′
kj = 1.
(iii) Obviously the identity matrix (identity function) belongs to BUL. Suppose that B is
nonsingular. Then B−1 belongs to BUL. Indeed, denote by b′
ij, i = 1,...,n, j = 1,...,n
the elements of B−1, and introduce βk :=
 n
i=1 b′
ki. We have to prove that βk = 1 for
k = 1,...,n. Since BB−1 = I, we have
 
k bikb′
kj = δij, with δij = 1 if i = j and 0
otherwise. Therefore we get the following linear system in β1,...,βn:
 
j
 
k
b1kb
′
kj =
 
k
b1kβk = 1
 
k
b2kβk = 1
. . .
. . .
 
k
bnkβk = 1
Note that α1 =     = αn = 1 is a solution of the system. Since B is nonsingular, it is
the unique solution.
21Note that not all B ∈ BUL are nonsingular. Take for example
B :=


0.5 0.5 0
0 1 0
1 0 0


which is a purely inﬂuential function of {1,2} upon 3. Generally speaking B is singular
if some row, say j, is a linear combination of some other rows. Then the decisions of
players j and those of these rows are dependent.
(iv) It is easy to compute Bn when B is a purely inﬂuential function of S upon T. First
we order the players so that S = {1,...,s} and T = {s + 1,...,s + t}. Let us call
BS the square submatrix corresponding to rows and columns from 1 to s, and BST
the submatrix corresponding to rows from s+1 to s+t and columns from 1 to s (see
ﬁgure below, left). We may denote therefore the matrix by B = (BS,BST). Note that
matrices BS,BST are arbitrary, provided the sum of coeﬃcients on each row is equal
to 1. It is not diﬃcult to see that Bn is still a purely inﬂuential function of S upon T
with the following structure (see ﬁgure, right):
B
n = (B
n
S,BS,TB
n−1
S ).
S T
T
S BS
BS,T
B =
S T
T
S Bn
S
BS,T Bn−1
S
Bn =
8 The negative inﬂuence index in the generalized framework
8.1 Deﬁnition of the index
The concept of negative inﬂuence for the model with a continuum of actions is naturally
related to the negative inﬂuence deﬁned in the model with a totally ordered set of actions.
Under the negative inﬂuence in the multi-action framework, the inclination of the player is
diﬀerent from the extreme action(s) of the coalition (that is, the action(s) placed farthest
from the inclination of the coalition), and the player’s decision comes ‘closer’ to such
an extreme action. In the model with a continuum of actions, the concept of negative
inﬂuence is deﬁned in the similar way as the negative inﬂuence in the multi-action model.
Let us formalize the concepts of negative inﬂuence. For each action x ∈ [a,b], we
deﬁne the set M(x) of all actions whose distance to the action x is maximal, i.e.,
M(x) := {  x ∈ [a,b] :   x = arg max
x′∈[a,b]
|x − x
′|}. (32)
We have |M(x)| ∈ {1,2}. In particular, for each S ⊆ N and i ∈ IS, M(iS) is the set of
all possible actions which are the farthest actions from the inclination iS of coalition S.
22For each S ⊆ N and j ∈ N \ S, the set of all (n − s + 1)-inclination vectors of potential
negative inﬂuence of S on j is deﬁned as
  I
[S]
S→j := {i
[S] ∈ [a,b]
n−s+1 : ij / ∈ M(iS)}. (33)
This means that in any inclination vector of potential negative inﬂuence of S on j, the
inclination of player j is not the extreme action of coalition S. For each S ⊆ N, j ∈ N\S,
B ∈ B, and i[S] ∈   I
[S]
S→j
  i
ij
S := arg min
  iS∈M(iS)
|ij −  iS| (34)
  i
(B(i))j
S := arg min
  iS∈M(iS)
|(B(i))j −  iS|. (35)
If |M(iS)| = 2, then   i
ij
S is the action from M(iS) which is closer to the inclination ij of
player j, and   i
(B(i))j
S is the action from M(iS) which is closer to the decision (B(i))j of j.
If |M(iS)| = 1, then   i
ij
S =  i
(B(i))j
S .
The set of all inclination vectors of negative inﬂuence of S on j under given B is
deﬁned as
I
neg[S]
S→j (B) :=
 
i
[S] ∈   I
[S]
S→j :
 
|ij − iS| < |(B(i))j − iS| ∧
     ij −  i
ij
S
      >
     (B(i))j −  i
(B(i))j
S
     
  
(36)
I
neg[S]
S→j (B) is therefore the set of all inclination vectors in [a,b]n−s+1 such that the inclina-
tion of player j is not the extreme action of coalition S, and it satisﬁes two conditions:
– The ﬁrst condition of I
neg[S]
S→j (B) means that the decision of player j goes farther from
the inclination of coalition S than his inclination was.
– The second condition says that the decision of player j comes closer to the extreme
action of coalition S than his inclination was.
Note that we need both conditions to deﬁne the negative inﬂuence, since none of these
conditions implies the another one. The two pictures below show the situations in which
one of the conditions is not satisﬁed:
r
  i
ij
S
r
iS
r
(B(i))j
r
ij
r
  i
ij
S
r
iS
r
(B(i))j
r
ij
Deﬁnition 11 Given B ∈ B, for each S ⊆ N, j ∈ N \ S, the negative inﬂuence index
of coalition S on player j is deﬁned as
D
neg(B,S → j) :=
 
I
neg[S]
S→j (B)
      ij −  i
ij
S
      −
     (B(i))j −  i
(B(i))j
S
     
 
di[S]
 
  I
[S]
S→j
     ij −  i
ij
S
      di[S]
. (37)
23The negative inﬂuence index deﬁned in (37) is related to the possibility negative inﬂuence
index for the multi-action model; see Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010b, [18], Deﬁnition
2). Similarly as for the positive inﬂuence, we can calculate the integral in the denominator
of deﬁnition (37).
Remark 4 If I = [a,b]n, then for each ∅  = S ⊂ N and j ∈ N \ S
 
  I
[S]
S→j
     ij −  i
ij
S
      di
[S] =
(b − a)n−s+2
2
. (38)
Proof:
 
  I
[S]
S→j
     ij −  i
ij
S
      di
[S] =
  b
a
...
  b
a
  b
a
  a+b
2
a
(b − ij) diS dij dik1 ... dikn−s−1+
+
  b
a
...
  b
a
  b
a
  b
a+b
2
(ij − a) diS dij dik1 ... dikn−s−1 =
=
  b
a
...
  b
a
  b
a
(b − ij)
 
a + b
2
− a
 
dij dik1 ... dikn−s−1+
+
  b
a
...
  b
a
  b
a
(ij − a)
 
b −
a + b
2
 
dij dik1 ... dikn−s−1 =
=
  b
a
...
  b
a
 
b − a
2
  
b   ij −
i2
j
2
 ij=b
ij=a
dik1 ... dikn−s−1+
+
  b
a
...
  b
a
 
b − a
2
  
i2
j
2
− a   ij
 ij=b
ij=a
dik1 ... dikn−s−1 =
(b − a)n−s+2
2
￿
8.2 Examples of negative inﬂuence
Let us calculate the negative inﬂuence indices for some examples for which we have
already calculated the positive inﬂuence indices.
Example 7 We consider Example 3.1 and the negative inﬂuence of player 1 on player
2. First of all, we have
M(i1) =

 
 
{1} if 0 ≤ i1 < 1
2
{0} if 1
2 < i1 ≤ 1
{0,1} if i1 = 1
2
and the set of potential negative inﬂuence
  I1→2 =
 
(i1,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2 : i2 / ∈ M(i1)
 
.
24The set   I1→2 is presented on the ﬁgure below. It consists of all the points of the square
without two intervals: one with i1 ∈
 
1
2,1
 
and i2 = 0, and one with i1 ∈
 
0, 1
2
 
and i2 = 1.
-
6
r
0
r
0.5
r
1
r 1
i1
i2
  I1→2
By virtue of (38), we have
 
  I1→2
     i2 −  i
i2
1
      di =
1
2
.
For the inﬂuence function B deﬁned by (8), we have I
neg
1→2(B) = ∅, because while there are
inclination vectors (i1,i2) that satisfy the second condition, no inclination vector satisﬁes
the ﬁrst condition of I
neg
1→2(B). Hence, Dneg(B,1 → 2) = 0.
Similarly for the inﬂuence function B′′ deﬁned by (10), I
neg
1→2(B′′) = ∅ and Dneg(B′′,1 →
2) = 0.
Let us consider now the inﬂuence function B′ deﬁned by (9). Note that I
neg
1→2(B′) =
  I1→2, and (B′(i))2 =  i
(B′(i))2
1 for each i ∈   I1→2. Hence,
 
I
neg
1→2(B′)
      i2 −  i
i2
1
      −
     (B
′(i))2 −  i
(B′(i))2
1
     
 
di =
 
  I1→2
     i2 −  i
i2
1
      di =
1
2
and Dneg(B′,1 → 2) = 1.
For the inﬂuence function Bx deﬁned in (11), the negative inﬂuence indices will have
also a positive value, although smaller than 1. Let us calculate the negative inﬂuence for
x = 1
2, that is, for the parameter leading to the maximal positive inﬂuence index equal
to 7
16.
I
neg
1→2(B
0.5) =
 
i ∈   I1→2 :
 
|i2 − i1| <
       
1
2
− i1
        ∧
     i2 −  i
i2
1
      >
       
1
2
−  i
(B(i))2
1
       
  
The ﬁgure below presents the set I
neg
1→2(B0.5) which consists of four subsets.
-
6
0
r
1
r 1
r
1
2
r
1
4
r 1
2
II
I
IV
III
i1
i2 I
neg
1→2(B0.5)
25The subsets of I
neg
1→2(B0.5) are the following:
I
negI
1→2(B
0.5) =
 
(i1,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2 :
 
0 ≤ i1 ≤
1
2
∧ i1 ≤ i2 <
1
2
  
I
negII
1→2 (B
0.5) =
 
(i1,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2 :
 
0 ≤ i1 ≤
1
2
∧ 2i1 −
1
2
< i2 < i1
  
I
negIII
1→2 (B
0.5) =
 
(i1,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2 :
 
1
2
< i1 ≤ 1 ∧ i1 ≤ i2 < 2i1 −
1
2
  
I
negIV
1→2 (B
0.5) =
 
(i1,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2 :
 
1
2
< i1 ≤ 1 ∧
1
2
< i2 < i1
  
.
We calculate the negative inﬂuence index D(B0.5,1 → 2) of player 1 on player 2 under
the inﬂuence function B0.5.
D
neg(B
0.5,1 → 2) =
 
I
neg
1→2(B0.5)
      i2 −  i
i2
1
      −
     
1
2 −  i
(B0.5(i))2
1
     
 
di
 
  I1→2
     i2 −  i
i2
1
      di
= 2
 
L∈{I,II,III,IV }
 
I
negL
1→2 (B0.5)
      i2 −  i
i2
1
      −
       
1
2
−  i
(B0.5(i))2
1
       
 
di
 
I
negI
1→2 (B0.5)
      i2 −  i
i2
1
      −
       
1
2
−  i
(B0.5(i))2
1
       
 
di =
  1
2
0
  1
2
i1
 
1
2
− i2
 
di2 di1 =
1
48
 
I
negII
1→2 (B0.5)
      i2 −  i
i2
1
      −
       
1
2
−  i
(B0.5(i))2
1
       
 
di =
  1
2
0
  i1
2i1− 1
2
 
1
2
− i2
 
di2 di1 =
1
16
 
I
negIII
1→2 (B0.5)
      i2 −  i
i2
1
      −
       
1
2
−  i
(B0.5(i))2
1
       
 
di =
  1
1
2
  2i1− 1
2
i1
 
i2 −
1
2
 
di2 di1 =
1
16
 
I
negIV
1→2 (B0.5)
      i2 −  i
i2
1
      −
       
1
2
−  i
(B0.5(i))2
1
       
 
di =
  1
1
2
  i1
1
2
 
i2 −
1
2
 
di2 di1 =
1
24
Hence,
D
neg(B
0.5,1 → 2) = 2
 
1
48
+
1
16
+
1
16
+
1
24
 
=
3
8
<
7
16
= D(B
0.5,1 → 2).
We conclude that under the inﬂuence function B0.5, the negative inﬂuence of player 1 on
player 2 is slightly smaller than the positive inﬂuence.
26Let us calculate the negative inﬂuence for x = 0 and for x = 1, that is, for the
parameters leading to the minimal positive inﬂuence index equal to 1
4.
The sets of I
neg
1→2(B0) and I
neg
1→2(B1) are the following:
I
neg
1→2(B
0) =
 
(i1,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2 :
 
1
2
≤ i1 ≤ 1 ∧ 0 < i2 < 1
  
I
neg
1→2(B
1) =
 
(i1,i2) ∈ [0,1]
2 :
 
0 ≤ i1 ≤
1
2
∧ 0 < i2 < 1
  
These sets are presented in the ﬁgures below.
-
6
r
0
r
1
r 1
i1
i2
r
0.5
I
neg
1→2(B0)
-
6
0
r
1
r 1
i1
i2
r
0.5
I
neg
1→2(B1)
We have
 
I
neg
1→2(B0)
      i2 −  i
i2
1
      −  i
(B0(i))2
1
 
di =
  1
1
2
  1
0
i2 di2 di1 =
1
4
 
I
neg
1→2(B1)
      i2 −  i
i2
1
      −
     1 −  i
(B1(i))2
1
     
 
di =
  1
2
0
  1
0
(1 − i2) di2 di1 =
1
4
Hence,
D
neg(B
0,1 → 2) = D
neg(B
1,1 → 2) =
1
2
>
1
4
= D(B
0,1 → 2) = D(B
1,1 → 2).
We conclude that under the inﬂuence functions B0 and B1, the negative inﬂuence of
player 1 on player 2 is greater than the positive inﬂuence.
Example 8 For the three-player example presented in Section 3.2 and the inﬂuence
function B deﬁned by (12), similarly as for the function given in (8), we have I
neg[13]
13→2 (B) =
∅ and Dneg(B,13 → 2) = 0.
Since the analysis of the negative inﬂuence is analogous to the study of the positive
inﬂuence, in this paper we focus mainly on the positive inﬂuence. Consequently, most of
the inﬂuence functions considered in this paper do not represent any negative inﬂuence.
We can show that the negative inﬂuence index is equal to zero also for the set of perfect
followers and purely inﬂuential functions deﬁned in Section 4, as well as for the unanimous
inﬂuence functions analyzed in Section 5.
27Proposition 9 I
neg
S→j(B) = ∅, and consequently Dneg(B,S → j) = 0, where B ∈ B,
∅  = S ⊂ N and j ∈ N \ S are the following:
(i) for each j ∈ F
per
B (S) \ S, where F
per
B (S) is the set of perfect followers of S under B;
(ii) for each B ∈ BS→T (purely inﬂuential function of S upon T);
(iii) for each majority inﬂuence function Maj
[t], where n ≥ t > ⌊n
2⌋, and each S such that
s ≥ t;
(iv) for each guru inﬂuence function Gur
[  k], and each S such that   k ∈ S;
(v) for the identity function Id.
We omit the proofs here, since they are analogous to the proofs of the corresponding
results on the negative inﬂuence in the model with a totally ordered set of actions; see
Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010b, [18]).
9 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have aimed at deﬁning and investigating the inﬂuence model with a
continuum of actions and at comparing the results of such a model with the ones obtained
in the model with an ordered set of possible actions (and its particular case, the yes-no
model). For the continuum case, we have deﬁned and studied the positive and negative
inﬂuence indices of a coalition on a player, the unanimous inﬂuence functions, the purely
inﬂuential function, the set of followers and perfect followers, the kernel of an inﬂuence
function, the set of ﬁxed points under a given inﬂuence function, and the linear inﬂuence
functions. The main diﬀerence between the two models lies naturally in the deﬁnitions
of the inﬂuence indices. While in the previous model the inﬂuence indices have been
deﬁned by the sums of some expressions over the particular sets, in the continuum case
the sums are replaced by the integrals. These integrals are calculated over particular
sets of inclination vectors which are of a smaller dimension than the set of n-inclination
vectors. In particular, we show the equivalence between the positive inﬂuence index of a
coalition on a player in a social network and the analogous positive inﬂuence index in a
corresponding network in which the coalition in question is treated as one player.
We like to stress that apart from comparing the results of the continuum case with
the ones obtained in the model with an ordered set of possible actions, in the present
paper we have also aimed at studying two concepts which we did not consider before, i.e.,
the ﬁxed points under an inﬂuence function, and the linear inﬂuence functions. Due to
the representation of the linear functions by matrices, such inﬂuence functions are very
convenient and worth studying. In particular, for the linear functions, being unanimous
on the boundaries is equivalent to being unanimous and is also equivalent to the fact that
all coeﬃcients in each row of the corresponding matrix always sum up to 1. According
to one of our results, a quick look at a matrix representing an unanimous linear function
shows us immediately if there is a positive inﬂuence of a coalition on a player and also
what the value of the inﬂuence index is.
To the best of our knowledge, the inﬂuence model with a continuum of actions has
not been investigated before. Since in real-life situations people frequently have to make
a choice of one option from among a continuum of options, we believe that our inﬂuence
model with a continuum of actions is of importance and contributes signiﬁcantly to the
voting literature.
28As already mentioned, within our project on inﬂuence in a social network, we have
investigated the inﬂuence indices and other tools for measuring the inﬂuence in the yes-
no model, in the multi-choice framework, and in the model with a continuum of actions,
and we have compared the yes-no model of inﬂuence with command games. The next
important research on the inﬂuence issues which we are going to conduct will be to
introduce dynamic aspects into the model. More precisely, we would like to investigate
a model in which the mutual inﬂuence does not stop necessarily after one step but may
iterate. In particular, we intend to study the behavior of the series of inﬂuence functions
and to look for convergent conditions for such series.
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